But today, I'm going to throw some cold water her way.
1. Too Good at the Poll Margins. A Gallup poll has Hillary doubling up on Obama at 42%-21%. Rasmussen's robo-poll isn't much different at 42-22. I don't like it. Having only run as a candidate in only one real campaign, Hillary needs more experience with tight races. So does her campaign team. Edwards and Obama are still challenging in early primary states, but Hillary really needs them to be more competitive if her campaign is going to be running on all cylinders for the general election.
2. Too Positive About the Surge. While at the VFW convention, Hillary claimed that "We've begun to change tactics in Iraq, and in some areas, particularly in Al Anbar province, it's working." First, this is inaccurate. As Anthony Cordesman made clear, the progress in al-Anbar was much more a matter of the luck of some Sunni tribal leaders changing sides than tactics associated with the surge. What's more, Hillary's indicating that she was influenced by the war cheerleading NY Times op-ed of Michael O'Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack. Would she actually give those clowns jobs in a Hillary administration?
3. Irresponsible About Maliki. But the worst is Hillary's irresponsible comments about removing Nouri al-Maliki as Iraqi prime minister. Who would take al-Maliki's place. Maliki's government is so weak because Iraqi politics is so fragmented. Not only does Iraq have the three big mutually irreconcilable Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish groups, but the Shiites and Sunnis are tremendously fragmented within themselves. According to Hillary:
The Iraqi government's failures have reinforced the widely held view that the Maliki government is nonfunctional and cannot produce a political settlement, because it is too beholden to religious and sectarian leaders . . ." Clinton went on to say she "hope[s] that the Iraqi parliament will replace Prime Minister Maliki with a less divisive and more unifying figure when it returns in a few weeks."Of course, the Maliki government is beholden to religious and sectarian leaders. That's because the Shiite political parties, civic institutions, militias, and population are mostly religious and sectarian. Here Hillary is biting out of the same delusion of "moderate" Iraqi government as Bush. In fact, a "moderate" government would be even weaker than the Maliki government because it's support would be even more fragmented and tenuous than Maliki's.
The American cause in Iraq is on such tenuous ground that it's difficult to say what should be done with Iraq's central government. My best guess is that supporting Shiite elites as they figure out how to govern is the wisest course in the long run. But replacing Maliki is a bad idea in both the short and the long run.
Hillary's week isn't going as badly as my week, but I'm still hoping she starts to do better.
Postscript 1: Glenn Greenwald criticizes Carl Levin's and, by implication, Hillary's call for the removal of Maliki as a sign that the Democrats are going to give support to the surge ("embrace and celebrate") while blaming the horrific conditions in Iraq on the Maliki government. According to Greenwald, the Dems are "afraid to challenge the U.S. military's claims that we are Winning, and are even afraid to oppose the Surge." That's not likely. Harry Reid is already on record as challenging Gen. Petraeus. Instead, I would bet that the Democrats don't have the votes to effectively challenge the military and have decided to minimize their target area for right-wing attacks. It appears to me that the Democrats want wins but are willing to tread very carefully if they can't get the wins.
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12 comments:
Given the absolute gravity of the situation, the fact that you and the Dems are more worried about how this plays out politically is quite telling.
Ric - Why bother waiting for the report? Obviously, you know much better than General Petraeus, just like Sen. Reid.
jd, General Petraeus's name will be on that report but it has been reported all over the news, even 'faux-news', that the White House will write the report and stick the General's name on it. So, I have no doubt that even though the surge is not working, the White House,the President, and his "surge" will be portrayed as successful.
Like you Ric, I am behind Hillary all the way. I am not sure that Hillary is buying the administration line so much as she is moving toward a view that I have held for some time, that it is very likely that there can be no true "Iraq" as we knew it with a central government in Baghdad. The invasion and occupation have so destabilized the region that I really think the best solution would be a Kurdish state,a Shiite state, and Sunni state each in their own regions. I do believe Hillary is right when she asserts that there is no military solution in Iraq.
Joe Biden has an interesting solution as well. One that covers everything well. Here it is, straight from his website:
Iraq: A Way Forward
President Bush does not have a strategy for victory in Iraq. His strategy is to prevent defeat and to hand the problem off to his successor. As a result, more and more Americans understandably want a rapid withdrawal, even at the risk of trading a dictator for chaos and a civil war that could become a regional war. Both are bad alternatives.
There is a third way that can achieve the two objectives most Americans share: to bring our troops home without leaving chaos behind. The idea is to maintain a unified Iraq by federalizing it and giving Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis breathing room in their own regions. The central government would be responsible for common interests, like border security and the distribution of oil revenues. The plan would bind the Sunnis - who have no oil -- by guaranteeing them a proportionate share of oil revenues. It would convene an international conference to secure support for the power sharing arrangement and produce a regional nonaggression pact, overseen by a Contact Group of major powers. It would call on the U.S. military to withdraw most U.S. troops from Iraq by the summer of 2008, with a residual force to keep Iraqis and their neighbors honest. It would increase economic aid but tie it to the protection of minority rights and the creation of a jobs program and seek funding from the oil-rich Gulf Arab states. The new, central reality in Iraq is deep and growing sectarian violence between the Shiites and Sunnis. In last December's elections, 90 percent of the votes went to sectarian lists. Ethnic militias increasingly are the law in Iraq. They have infiltrated the official security forces. Massive unemployment is feeding the sectarian militia. Sectarian cleansing has forced at least 250,000 Iraqis to flee their homes in recent months. At the same time, Al Qaeda is now so firmly entrenched in Western Iraq that it has morphed into an indigenous jihadist threat. As a result, Iraq risks becoming what it was not before the war: a haven for radical fundamentalists.
There is no purely military solution to the sectarian civil war. The only way to break the vicious cycle of violence - and to create the conditions for our armed forces to responsibly withdraw -- is to give Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds incentives to pursue their interests peacefully. That requires an equitable and viable power sharing arrangement. That's where Joe Biden's plan comes in. This plan is not partition - in fact, it may be the only way to prevent violent partition and preserve a unified Iraq. This plan is consistent with Iraq's constitution, which provides for Iraq's 18 provinces to join together in regions, with their own security forces, and control over most day-to-day issues. This plan is the only idea on the table for dealing with the militia, which are likely to retreat to their respective regions. This plan is consistent with a strong central government, with clearly defined responsibilities. Indeed, it provides an agenda for that government, whose mere existence will not end sectarian violence.
The example of Bosnia is illustrative. Ten years ago, Bosnia was being torn apart by ethnic cleansing. The United States stepped in decisively with the Dayton Accords to keep the country whole by, paradoxically, dividing it into ethnic federations. We even allowed Muslims, Croats and Serbs to retain separate armies. With the help of U.S. troops and others, Bosnians have lived a decade in peace. Now, they are strengthening their central government, and disbanding their separate armies.
The course we're on leads to a terrible civil war and possibly a regional war. Joe Biden's plan is designed to head that off. He believe it is the best way to bring our troops home, protect our fundamental security interests, and preserve Iraq as a unified country.
The question for those who reject this plan is simple: what is your alternative?
A Five Point Plan for Iraq
1. Establish One Iraq, with Three Regions
Federalize Iraq in accordance with its constitution by establishing three largely autonomous regions - Shiite, Sunni and Kurd -- with a strong but limited central government in Baghdad
Put the central government in charge of truly common interests: border defense, foreign policy, oil production and revenues
Form regional governments -- Kurd, Sunni and Shiite -- responsible for administering their own regions
2. Share Oil Revenues
Gain agreement for the federal solution from the Sunni Arabs by guaranteeing them 20 percent of all present and future oil revenues -- an amount roughly proportional to their size -- which would make their region economically viable
Empower the central government to set national oil policy and distribute the revenues, which would attract needed foreign investment and reinforce each community's interest in keeping Iraq intact and protecting the oil infrastructure
3. Convene International Conference, Enforce Regional Non-Aggression Pact
Convene with the U.N. a regional security conference where Iraq's neighbors, including Iran, pledge to support Iraq's power sharing agreement and respect Iraq's borders
Engage Iraq's neighbors directly to overcome their suspicions and focus their efforts on stabilizing Iraq, not undermining it
Create a standing Contact Group, to include the major powers, that would engage Iraq's neighbors and enforce their commitments
4. Responsibly Drawdown US Troops
Direct U.S. military commanders to develop a plan to withdraw and re-deploy almost all U.S. forces from Iraq by the summer of 2008
Maintain in or near Iraq a small residual force -- perhaps 20,000 troops -- to strike any concentration of terrorists, help keep Iraq's neighbors honest and train its security forces
5. Increase Reconstruction Assistance and Create a Jobs Program
Provide more reconstruction assistance, conditioned on the protection of minority and women's rights and the establishment of a jobs program to give Iraqi youth an alternative to the militia and criminal gangs
Insist that other countries take the lead in funding reconstruction by making good on old commitments and providing new ones -- especially the oil-rich Arab Gulf countries
Plan for Iraq: What It Is - and What It Is Not
Some commentators have either misunderstood the Plan, or mischaracterized it. Here is what the plan is - and what it is not:
1. The Plan is not partition.
In fact, it may be the only way to prevent a violent partition - which has already started -- and preserve a unified Iraq. We call for a strong central government, with clearly defined responsibilities for truly common interests like foreign policy and the distribution of oil revenues. Indeed, the Plan provides an agenda for that government, whose mere existence will not end sectarian violence.
2. The Plan is not a foreign imposition.
To the contrary, it is consistent with Iraq's constitution, which already provides for Iraq's 18 provinces to join together in regions, with their own security forces, and control over most day-to-day issues. On October 11, Iraq's parliament approved legislation to implement the constitution's articles on federalism. Prior to the British colonial period and Saddam's military dictatorship, what is now Iraq functioned as three largely autonomous regions.
But federalism alone is not enough. To ensure Sunni support, it is imperative that Iraqis also agree to an oil revenue sharing formula that guarantees the Sunni region economic viability. The United States should strongly promote such an agreement. The final decisions will be up to Iraqis, but if we do not help them arrange the necessary compromises, nothing will get done. At key junctures in the past, we have used our influence to shape political outcomes in Iraq, notably by convincing the Shiites and Kurds to accept a provision allowing for the constitution to be amended following its adoption, which was necessary to secure Sunni participation in the referendum. Using our influence is not the same as imposing our will. With 140,000 Americans at risk, we have a right and an obligation to make known our views.
3. The Plan is not an invitation to sectarian cleansing.
Tragically, that invitation has been sent, received and acted upon. Since the Samarra mosque bombing in February, one quarter of a million Iraqis have fled their homes for fear of sectarian violence, at a rate now approaching 10,000 people a week. That does not include hundreds of thousands of Iraqis - many from the professional class - who have left Iraq since the war. Only a political settlement, as proposed in the Plan, has a chance to stop this downward spiral.
4. The Plan is the only idea on the table for dealing with the sectarian militia.
It offers a realistic albeit interim solution. Realistic, because none of the major groups will give up their militia voluntarily in the absence of trust and confidence and neither we or the Iraqi government has the means to force them to do so. Once federalism is implemented, the militias are likely to retreat to their respective regions to protect their own and vie for power, instead of killing the members of other groups. But it is only an interim solution, because no nation can sustain itself peacefully with private armies. Over time, if a political settlement endures, the militia would be incorporated into regional and national forces, as is happening in Bosnia.
5. The Plan is an answer to the problem of mixed cities.
Large cities with mixed populations present a challenge under any plan now being considered. The essence of the Plan is that mixed populations can only live together peacefully if their leadership is truly satisfied with the overall arrangement. If so, that leadership will help keep the peace in the cities. At the same time, we would make Baghdad a federal city, and buttress the protection of minorities there and in the other mixed cities with an international peacekeeping force. Right now, the prospect for raising such a force is small. But following a political settlement, an international conference and the establishment of a Contact Group, others are more likely to participate, including countries like Saudi Arabia which have offered peacekeepers in the past.
6. The Plan is in the self-interest of Iran.
Iran likes it exactly as it is in Iraq - with the United States bogged down and bleeding. But the prospect of a civil war in Iraq is not in Tehran's interest: it could easily spill over Iraq's borders and turn into a regional war with neighbors intervening on opposing sides and exacerbating the Sunni-Shiite divide at a time Shiite Iran is trying to exert leadership in the Islamic world. Iran also would receive large refugee flows as Iraqis flee the fighting. Iran, like all of Iraq's neighbors, has an interest in Iraq remaining unified and not splitting into independent states. Iran does not want to see an independent Kurdistan emerge and serve as an example for its own restive 5 million Kurds. That's why Iran - and all of Iraq's neighbors -- can and should be engaged to support a political settlement in Iraq.
7. The Plan is in the self-interest of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds.
The Sunnis increasingly understand they will not regain power in Iraq. Faced with the choice of being a permanent minority player in a central government dominated by Shiites or having the freedom to control their day-to-day lives in a Sunni region, they are likely to choose the latter provided they are guaranteed a fair share of oil revenues to make their region viable. The Shiites know they can dominate Iraq politically, but not defeat a Sunni insurgency, which can bleed Iraq for years. The Kurds may dream of independence, but fear the reaction of Turkey and Iran - their interest is to achieve as much autonomy as possible while keeping Iraq together. Why would Shiites and Kurds give up some oil revenues to the Sunnis? Because that is the price of peace and the only way to attract the massive foreign investment needed to maximize Iraqi oil production. The result will be to give Shiites and Kurds a smaller piece of a much larger oil pie and give all three groups an incentive to protect the oil infrastructure.
A viable solution in my view and very similar to Hillary's.
The actual bill Hillary sponsored regarding Iraq was originally introduced this February, S.670. Here is the CRS summary of the bill:
S.670
Title: A bill to set forth limitations on the United States military presence in Iraq and on United States aid to Iraq for security and reconstruction, and for other purposes.
Sponsor: Sen Clinton, Hillary Rodham [NY] (introduced 2/16/2007)
Related Bills: H.R.2062
Latest Major Action: 2/16/2007 Referred to Senate committee. Status: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
SUMMARY AS OF:
2/16/2007--Introduced.
Iraq Troop Protection and Reduction Act of 2007 -
Prohibits, with a limited presidential national security waiver, U.S. military force levels in Iraq after the date of the enactment of this Act from exceeding such levels as of January 1, 2007.
Prohibits appropriations for security and reconstruction assistance to the government of Iraq 90 days after enactment of this Act unless the President provides Congress with a specified certification respecting Iraq's: (1) security forces; (2) oil revenue distribution; (3) civil rights and political accommodation concerning its ethnic and sectarian groups; and (4) policy towards the participation of former Baath party members in the Iraqi government.
Terminates authority for the use of U.S. military forces in Iraq 90 days after enactment of this Act unless the use of such forces is specifically authorized by Congress in a statute enacted after enactment of this Act or the President provides Congress with a specified certification respecting:
(1) U.S. redeployment and mission transition;
(2) Iraq's security forces;
(3) oil revenue distribution;
(4) civil rights and political accommodation concerning Iraq's ethnic and sectarian groups;
(5) the participation of former Baath party members in the Iraqi government; and
(6) the convening of an international conference on Iraq. States that the termination shall: (1) continue in effect if Congress enacts a joint resolution disapproving the President's certification; and
(2) not be construed to prohibit the use of U.S. military forces in Iraq for force protection, force security, or similar purposes during the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq.
Prohibits the obligation or expenditure of funds to deploy U.S. military forces to Iraq unless the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that such forces are adequately equipped and trained for their missions.
Not bad.
toddmayo - Given the fact that Gen. Petraeus will be testifying before Congress concurrent with the release of the report, I would thnk that if he disagrees with the assessment, he will say so. To date, he has shown no inclination to not state his mind. As always, just because you can conceive a concept, does not make it so.
There's plenty of reasons for Petraeus to hold back on any disagreements. It's pretty clear likes being commanding general in Iraq. If Petraeus disagreed with Bush in a non-trivial way, there's a good chance he'd be removed. It's happened to other people. Why not Petraeus? Petraeus doesn't want his job taken by Congress either and he's savvy enough to know that anything but optimism will mean a stronger push to cut off war funding. Commanding American forces in Iraq is the assignment of a lifetime for a guy like Petraeus. You can bet that he's going to shave his assessment to make sure he keeps that job a little longer.
Greenwald also did an entire series of essays on bs from Iraq ("things are going swimmingly here in 2004" "we found the WMD's in 2003", etc) all from Patraeus before he took over. It is not hard to make Dave look partisan. He will wordlessly go along with the president, because he believes the tripe.
Further, more interesting, the key to Greenwald's argument is the absolute silliness of saying the Surge is working, because Anbar is more quiet. The Surge wasn't and isn't designed to stop violence in Anbar; it's supposed to create political dialogue in Baghdad. It has, by us arming the Sunnis in Anbar, actually resulted in less political compromise, since Maliki is afraid of armed Sunni militias and the Sunnis feel more empowered to defy him because they now have cool guns!
The fact that Levin and Clinton, etc are saying the Surge is sort of working is the sign they are abandoning their opposition.
The Surge wasn't and isn't designed to stop violence in Anbar; it's supposed to create political dialogue in Baghdad.
Haven't we gone over this point already? The surge is designed to create a more secure environment. The secure environment is supposed to nudge along the political process. That there is a more secure environment is evidence that the surge is working. What the Iraqi's choose to do with the oppurtunity does not reflect on the military success.
The fact that Levin and Clinton, etc are saying the Surge is sort of working is the sign they are abandoning their opposition.
Assuming the surge is working, should they continue their opposition in the face of contrary evidence? Do you feel that the opposition is necessary because of the policy or because of the policy maker?
Oh, and it's nice to see Cut'n'paste Mayo back. Any chance you could learn to link to the article, instead?
timb - It is simply disrespectful to refer to him as Dave. He has earned his title.
Well, JD, first, because his is the easiest. JD, I respect military service, but I am not obligated to type Lt. General Patraeus every time I refer him, anymore than I need to call by your former JAG rank. I am NOT in the Armed Forces, America is not a military society, etc. If Gen. Patraeus and I happened to be in the same room and I went to address him, I would use his title, as that is polite. But, spare me the lecture on honorific, unless you want it replayed the next time you use the word "Hillary" or "Clinton" or "Obama."
First, ef point: WE did go over it and agreed to disagree. I posted a link to the President's speech about security in Baghdad, you argued as a tactic it was working, I argued as a strategy it wasn't, and we agreed to hug (admission: I might be a little hazy on the hug plan).
Thusly, since the Surge is a strategy borne of a flawed policy that has not, is not, and will not work, i.e. a Western Democracy in Iraq, I am for a change in strategy to mitigate US losses (234 as of today for the summer) and allow the Iraqi to determine what form of Shia government they want.
It has less to do with anyone saying the tripe that the war can be won (ask my father), than it does the fact that the war with those cannot be won. So, I want my politicians of either party to recognize he dead and wounded of Iraq and start the process of withdrawal.
3 for 3. I feel like a Texas Ranger hitter
On occasion, I slip, and neglect to use people's titles. That is the exception, and not the rule, even for former President Clinton, Sen. Clinton, Sen. Kerry, and Sen. Kennedy. I respect them, and their offices, and despite our political differences, they have earned their title.
You "slip," and I do it out of lazy typing.
I don't disrespect or respect Lt. Gen Patraeus anymore than any clay-footed public official. I refuse to be bound by formality when I'm typing on Blogger.
You might also notice "bad typing" as well as lazy....
If you hadn't noticed it, then I must seem even less articulate than I thought you thought I was!
How's that for articulation? I think i confused myself
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