American troops entered the Shiite slum of Sadr City by the hundreds in the latest initiative of the surge campaign. Under Gen. Daniel Petraeus' counter-insurgency strategy, the U. S. military is setting up a "security center" as a way to have a forward presence in a Sadr City neighborhood. It also looks like troops are creating a blockade on Sadr City.
The beginning of the Sadr City campaign has created an interesting illusion/reality problem. Because American troops met no militia resistance, it seems like they're making progress. But the progress is an illusion. The Mahdi Army, Badr Brigades, and other militias and their death squads have decided to lay low, but they're very potent forces that command the loyalty of Sadr City residents. It looks like the militias might want to wait out the occupation.
But the American military can't allow that to happen. If the militias emerge from the occupation intact, they would be able to maintain their grip on the government and resume death squad activity as soon as the Americans left. In other words, the surge would have failed to help create the conditions for a "stable democracy" in Iraq among the Shiite population in Baghdad.
The American military and Iraqi governments know this. That's why the Iraqi government claims that it's going to purge the government and arrest "lawbreakers"--in other words militia leaders. It's also why the U. S. military is doing house to house searches. The idea is to bring the militias out of hiding and defeat them militarily. If the militias can't be drawn out to the flypaper, the U. S. wants to force them out.
From the U. S. point of view, the initial illusion of progress and stability needs to be undermined so that long-lasting stability can be achieved.
This means triggering a battle that would appear to mean that American forces were failing and would get a lot of bad press in the short term. After winning such a battle or series of battles, the U. S. would then pacify the neighborhoods and begin the long-term work of economic and political reconstruction. That's the Petraeus Doctrine--Clear, Hold, and Reconstruct.
But I think that the idea long-term progress is also an illusion. The guiding assumption of the American occupiers is that large populations can be converted to the American/Iraqi govt cause if Sadr City neighborhoods are cleared of militias. To the contrary, it seems much more likely that Sadr City residents would become more antagonistic toward the Americans and Iraqi government. American doctrine assumes that residents of cities and neighborhoods have no connection with the insurgents. However, if the U. S. destroys the Mahdi Army and Badr Brigades, they will be killing the male relatives--husbands, uncles, brothers, sons, and sisters-- of families--all over Sadr City. In my opinion, no forward command forces, no American candy, and no economic reconstruction would have much impact on the resentment and bitterness of the Sadr City population after any decisive battle with the Mahdi Army. Instead, the U. S. would have to engage in a full scale occupation that would make Sadr City into another Fallujah or Ramadi.
In the minds of those planning the surge, American military power has an almost infinite ability to bend civilian populations to its will. I'm afraid that the U. S. military is going to discover once again that the idea of infinite power is the biggest illusion of all.
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